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Court of Appeals COURT OF APPEALS 
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230 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: State of Utah v. John E. Humphrey 
Dear Ms. Noonan: 
Please be advised that I have been asked by Mr. John Hill of 
the Legal Defender's Association to clarify one matter in the 
brief which I submitted in the above referenced matter in August, 
1989. It has been brought to my attention that I have mistakenly 
submitted a verbatim copy of an identical point previously 
submitted in State of Utah v. Webb, a brief which was submitted 
by Christine Soltis. I now understand that rather than 
reprinting her argument in our brief, I should have joined with 
Ms. Soltis in her argument in the Webb brief. 
Please make sure that the record is clear on this point. 
The original research and argument should be credited to Ms. 
Christine Soltis. I am sorry for the misunderstanding and any 
inconvenience I may have caused the Court. 
Thank you, in advance, for your cooperation. If there is 
any additional steps which need to be taken on my part to further 
clarify this matter, please do not hesitate to call. 
Sincerely, 
CONNIE L. MOWER 
cc: John Hill 
Dan Larsen 
John Humphrey 
Christine Soltis 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
J u r i s d i c t i o n i s c o n f e r r e d on t h i s Cour t p u r s u a n t t o Utah 
Code Ann. § 7 7 - 3 5 - 2 6 ( 2 ) (a) (1953 a s amended) and U tah Code Ann. 
§78 -2 -2 (3 ) (h) (1953 as amended) / whereby a d e f e n d a n t in a c r i m i n a l 
c a s e may t a k e an a p p e a l t o t he Supreme Cour t from a f i n a l judgment 
of c o n v i c t i o n fo r a f i r s t d e g r e e f e l o n y . In t h i s c a s e , Mr. 
Humphrey was c o n v i c t e d of A g g r a v a t e d R o b b e r y , a f i r s t d e g r e e 
f e l o n y ; j u d g m e n t was r e n d e r e d by t h e H o n o r a b l e J a m e s S. S a w a y a , 
T h i r d J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n and fo r S a l t Lake C o u n t y , S t a t e 
of U t a h . 
- v i -
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Was Mr. Humphrey denied the e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of 
c o u n s e l due to a c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t a f f e c t i n g h i s t r i a l 
a t t o r n e y 1 s performance? 
2. Was t h e r e i n s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t a 
convic t ion for Aggravated Robbery? 
3* Did t h e c u m u l a t i v e e f f e c t of s e v e r a l of t h e 
p r o s e c u t o r ' s remarks amount to misconduct warrant ing a new t r i a l ? 
4. Did the T r i a l Cour t commit p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r in 
denying Mr. Humphrey's motion to recuse Judge Sawaya? 
5. Was Mr. Humphrey's r i g h t to due p r o c e s s v i o l a t e d 
when the S ta te destroyed a photo spread t h a t was evidence m a t e r i a l 
to h i s g u i l t or innocence? 
- v i i -
Mr. Webb moved for a directed verdict on the basis that the 
evidence at trial was insufficient (T.425). This motion was 
renewed after closing arguments (T.622) and again by Mr. Webb in 
his motion for a new trial (T.741-42). All of the above motions 
were denied (T.425r 622, 742-43). 
Prior to trial, Mr. Webb made a motion in limine joined 
by Mr. Humphrey to exclude evidence of any prior bad acts of the 
defendant (R. 105-06). This was granted and renewed as a reminder 
at the start of trial (T.61-62). At trial, however, the 
prosecutor made or elicited remarks concerning previous police 
stops (T.488-89, 617; objection at Ij3. and T.746) , evidence of 
other crimes (T.304-05; objection at T.323-24), Mr. Webbfs alias 
(T.327; objection at T.428-29), and Mr. Humphrey's refusal to take 
part in a lineup (T.615; objection at R.289-290, 623, 748). 
Prior to the giving of instructions, Mr. Webb objected 
to No. 16 (T.624-25; identified there as No. 17). The objection 
was based on the claim that the last sentence of the instruction 
was argumentative and an improper emphasis on part of the evidence 
(T.625). 
On June 22, 1988, after jury trial, Co-Defendant Webb 
and Mr. Humphrey were found guilty as charged of aggravated 
robbery in violation of Utah Code Ann. §77-6-302 (1978). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant Humphrey was denied his right to the effective 
a s s i s t a n c e of c o u n s e l b e c a u s e h i s a p p o i n t e d c o u n s e l , the S a l t Lake 
L e g a l D e f e n d e r s A s s o c i a t i o n , i m p r o p e r l y r e p r e s e n t e d b o t h Mr. 
Humphrey and h i s C o - D e f e n d a n t Webb a t t h e i r j o i n t t r i a l . T h i s 
c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t w a r r a n t s a r e v e r s a l of Mr. Humphrey ' s 
c o n v i c t i o n . 
The p r o s e c u t o r c o n t i n u a l l y and i n t e n t i o n a l l y v i o l a t e d a 
p r e - t r i a l o r d e r l i m i t i n g i n q u i r y i n t o o t h e r a l l e g e d bad a c t s and 
o t h e r w i s e s o l i c i t e d improper r e m a r k s . The c u m u l a t i v e e f f e c t of 
t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s c o n d u c t c r e a t e d p r e j u d i c e t o Mr. Humphrey 
j u s t i f y i n g a r e v e r s a l in l i g h t of the g e n e r a l i n s u f f i c i e n c y of the 
e v i d e n c e a g a i n s t Mr. Humphrey. 
The t r i a l c o u r t commi t t ed p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r in denying 
Mr. H u m p h r e y ' s m o t i o n t o r e c u s e t h e t r i a l j u d g e f o r p r e j u d i c e . 
The t r i a l c o u r t had a d u t y t o a v o i d even t h e a p p e a r a n c e of b i a s 
a g a i n s t a d e f e n d a n t . 
Mr. Humphrey's r i g h t t o due p r o c e s s of law was v i o l a t e d 
when t h e S t a t e d e s t r o y e d p h o t o s p r e a d s w h i c h w e r e e v i d e n c e 
m a t e r i a l t o t h e f i n d i n g of Mr. H u m p h r e y ' s i n n o c e n c e or g u i l t . 
B e c a u s e t h i s e v i d e n c e was d e s t r o y e d , Mr. H u m p h r e y ' s c o u n s e l was 
p r e c l u d e d from e f f e c t i v e l y a t t a c k i n g the l a t e r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of 
t h e d e f e n d a n t by t he e y e w i t n e s s e s . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. MR. HUMPHREY WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO A CONFLICT OF 
INTEREST AFFECTING HIS TRIAL ATTORNEY'S PERFORMANCE 
7 
A. Requirement of Separate State Analysis, 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution 
provides, in pertinent part, that: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
have the right to appear and defend in person 
and by counsel ... In no instance shall any 
accused person, before final judgment, be 
compelled to advance money or fees to secure 
the rights herein guaranteed. 
The state provision clearly differs in language from the Sixth 
Amendment of the federal constitution which guarantees an accused 
in a criminal prosecution the "assistance of counsel for his 
defense." 
The federal provision has been universally interpreted 
as requiring the reasonably effective assistance of counsel. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 25 L.Ed 2d 
763 (1984). Utah has adopted the same standard in applying the 
federal provision. State v. Lovell, 758 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 
1988). Under either federal or state case law, a defendant who 
claims that his rights to the assistance of counsel under the 
Sixth Amendment were violated must show that his trial counsel 
"rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner ... 
and that [his] counsel's performance prejudiced" him. State v. 
Julian, Case No. 870351 (Utah S.Ct., March 28, 1989); State v. 
Speer, 750 P.2d 186 (Utah 1988) and State v. Archuleta, 747 P.2d 
1019 (Utah 1987). A defendant is prejudiced when "a reasonable 
probability exists that except for ineffective counsel, the result 
8 
would have been different." State v. Lovell, supra; Str ickland 
v. Washing ton, _s.H££3.« Any modification of the federal 
interpretation of the federal constitutional standard has been 
expressly rejected by the Utah Court. State v. Verdey 101 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 37, 41 n. 2 (1989). 
However, despite repeated requests for separate analysis 
of the state constitutional provision, State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 
1239 (Utah 1988) and State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987), no 
Utah decision has ever considered the parameters of the state 
guarantee. This omission has created state case law which simply 
wmarch[s] lock-step with interpretation given to ... the United 
States Constitution." State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 272 (Utah 
1986) (J. Durham, concurring opinion). 
But: 
The legal revolution which has brought federal 
law to the fore must not be allowed to inhibit 
the independent protective force of state law 
- for without it, the full realization of our 
liberties cannot be guaranteed. 
Wm. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protections of Individual 
Rights, 90 Harvard L. Rev. 489, 491 (1977). 
Unfortunately, because the Utah Courts until 1986 failed 
to even note the need for any separate analytic comparisons of 
state and federal constitutional provisions, earlier case law is 
of little value. To compound the void of precedent, there is 
virtually no legislative history discussing the intent of the Utah 
9 
f o u n d e r s in not a d o p t i n g the f e d e r a l l a n g u a g e . Yet , the f a i l u r e 
of p r i o r Utah c a s e s to f u l l y a r t i c u l a t e the p a r a m e t e r s of s t a t e 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n cannot excuse p a s s i v i t y now. For even 
where the s t a t e and f ede ra l p r o h i b i t i o n s are t e x t u a l l y i d e n t i c a l , 
s t a t e c o u r t d e c i s i o n s i n t e r p r e t i n g the s t a t e p r o v i s i o n remain 
s t a t e law d e s p i t e subsequent federa l d o c t r i n a l changes. S t a t e v. 
C a r a h e r , 293 Or. 7 4 1 , 653 P.2d 942 (1982); C a r s o n , "Las t Things 
L a s t " : A Methodolog i c a l Approach to Lega l Argument in S t a t e 
Cour t s , 19 Wil lamet te L. Rev. 641 ( F a l l , 1983) . 
T h i s C o u r t i s t h e n f a c e d w i t h a " c l e a n s l a t e " in 
a n a l y z i n g A r t i c l e I , S e c t i o n 12 of the Utah S t a t e C o n s t i t u t i o n . 
While the s t a t e may c l a i m t h a t t h i s Cour t should not g e n e r a l l y 
cons t rue the Utah c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p rov i s ion more nar rowly , such an 
argument f a i l s to recognize t h a t : 
Because United S t a t e s Supreme Court d e c i s i o n s 
... mark the minimum guaran tees of i n d i v i d u a l 
r i g h t s , s t a t e c o u r t s t h a t g i v e t r u l y 
independent force to t h e i r own c o n s t i t u t i o n s 
g e n e r a l l y r each r e s u l t s more p r o t e c t i v e of 
those r i g h t s than the Supreme Cour t . 
The New F e d e r a l i s m : Toward a. Pr i n c i p l e d I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e 
S t a t e C o n s t i t u t i o n , 29 S t an . L. Rev. 297, a t 297 (1977). The 
f e d e r a l d e c i s i o n may p e r s u a d e , but t h e y c a n n o t compe l , t he 
acceptance of the f e d e r a l minimum guarantee as the s t a t e ' s maximum 
defense of i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s . S ta te v. J e w e t t , 500 A.2d 233 (Vt. 
1985) . 
10 
The application of this analysis will be discussed 
below. 
B. Requirements of a Conflict of Interest. 
As discussed, before the alleged deficiencies of a 
counsel's performance will be considered by an appellate court, 
the defendant must establish that he "suffered unfair prejudice as 
a result of the alleged deficiencies." State v. Lovell, supra; 
State v. Archuleta, supra. Absent actual prejudice, a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel will not warrant reversal of a 
conviction. Id. 
But, an entirely different approach is taken where the 
claim of ineffectiveness is, as here, based on a conflict of 
interest in the representation of the defendant. 
[I]f a criminal defendant is represented at 
trial by an attorney, either appointed or 
retained, who labors under an actual, and not 
merely a potential conflict of interest, the 
defendant has been denied effective assistance 
of counsel as a matter of law; and, unless he 
has knowingly and intelligently waived his 
sixth amendment right to conflict-free 
representation, reversal is automatic. No 
prejudice need be shown. (Citations omitted). 
United States v. Martinez, 630 F.2d 361, 362 (5th Cir. 1980) 
relying on Holloway v. Arkansas, 435, U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 
L.Ed.2d 426 (1978). 
In Holloway v. Arkansas, supra, the United States 
Supreme Court reversed the convictions when it concluded that the 
trial court had improperly required a public defender to jointly 
11 
represent three defendants despite timely objections that such 
representation created a conflict of interest. Where the 
potential of a conflict had been raised at trial, the Court held 
that prejudice would be presumed. 435 U.S. at 490. 
Two years later, the United States Supreme Court refined 
its standard. In Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 
1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980), unlike Holloway, the defendant first 
claimed that his lawyers represented conflicting interests in a 
post-conviction habeas corpus action. Noting that under the 
facts, the defendant had not established that an actual conflict 
of interest existed but merely had demonstrated the possibility of 
conflict, the Court held that reversal was not mandated. 466 U.S. 
at 350. 
From this, two rules evolve. Where a potential conflict 
is brought to the attention of the trial court prior to or during 
trial and the trial court fails to act, the mere fact of a 
potential or possible conflict will warrant reversal without any 
further showing of prejudice. Where, however, the conflict is not 
brought to the attention of the trial court but only raised on 
appeal, the defendant "must demonstrate the existence of an actual 
conflict of interest." People v. Jones, 520 N.E.2d 325, 328 (111. 
1988); United States v. Newman, 733 F.2d 1395 (10th Cir . 1984). 
Stated another way, it is now recognized: 
. . . that prejudice would be irrelevant if it 
12 
cou ld be shown t h a t [ t h e a t t o r n e y ' s ] c o n f l i c t 
of i n t e r e s t had any a c t u a l e f f e c t whatever on 
h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of [ t h e d e f e n d a n t ] , 
Sanchez v . S t a t e , 756 S.W.2d 452 , 454 (Ark. 1 9 8 8 ) . I t i s o n l y : 
. . . n e c e s s a r y t h a t a c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t 
m u s t h a v e a c t u a l l y e x i s t e d o r h a v e b e e n 
i n h e r e n t in t h e f a c t s of t h e c a s e from wh ich 
t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of p r e j u d i c e f l o w e d . 
S t a t e v . Thompson, 108 A r i z . 500, 502 P.2d 1319, 1323 ( 1 9 7 9 ) . 
T u r n i n g t o t h e f a c t s a t b a r , Mr. Humphrey was a r r e s t e d 
on N o v e m b e r 4 , 1987 and a l e g a l d e f e n d e r was a p p o i n t e d t o 
r e p r e s e n t h i m . A p r e l i m i n a r y h e a r i n g was h e l d f o r D e f e n d a n t s 
Humphrey and Webb on November 24 and 25; both were r e p r e s e n t e d by 
members of t h e S a l t Lake Legal De fende r s A s s o c i a t i o n . (R.16-18) . 
On D e c e m b e r 1 1 , 1 9 8 7 , a t t h e t i m e of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t 
a r r a i g n m e n t , t h e L.D.A. w i t h d r e w from r e p r e s e n t i n g Mr. Webb and 
Mr. Webb p r i v a t e l y r e t a i n e d Mr. Ray S t o d d a r d t o r e p r e s e n t him 
(R.21). S u b s e q u e n t l y , Webb and Humphrey's t r i a l was s eve red from 
t h a t of Mr. Webb 's g i r l f r i e n d , Renae G r e g e r s e n ( R . 6 8 - 6 9 ) . On 
March 1 0 , 1 9 8 8 , Mr. S t o d d a r d f i l e d a M o t i o n t o S e v e r D e f e n d a n t 
Webb from Humphrey b u t moved t o w i t h d r a w as c o u n s e l a t t h e same 
t i m e ( R . 8 1 - 8 2 ) . On March 2 2 , 1 9 8 8 , t h e S a l t Lake L e g a l D e f e n d e r s 
A s s o c i a t i o n was a g a i n a p p o i n t e d t o r e p r e s e n t Mr. Webb ( R . 8 8 ) . 
Th is a p p o i n t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n c o n t i n u e d t h rough t r i a l . No r u l i n g 
was e v e r made on t h e M o t i o n t o S e v e r Mr. Webb from C o - D e f e n d a n t 
Humphrey . No m i n u t e e n t r y shows t h e w i t h d r a w a l of t h e m o t i o n . 
Mr. Humphrey r a i s e d t h e i s s u e p r o se ( R . 9 8 ) . Mr. Webb r e - r a i s e d 
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the severance i ssue in h i s Motion for New T r i a l (R.287-88) . 
Entwined w i th Mr. Humphrey's r e p e a t e d r e q u e s t s for 
severance from Co-Defendant Webb, i s h i s c la im t h a t the re was both 
an inherent and a c t u a l c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t in the Sa l t Lake Legal 
Defenders Assoc ia t ion j o i n t l y r ep resen t ing himsel f and Webb under 
the f ac t s and c i rcumstances of h i s case (R.287-88) . 
To be c l e a r , i t i s not Defendant Humphrey's p o s i t i o n 
t h a t the j o i n t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n by a s soc i a t ed a t t o r n e y s i s per se , 
p r o h i b i t e d . B a t c h e l o r v. S m i t h , 555 P.2d 871 (Utah 1976) . Nor, 
i s i t h i s p o s i t i o n t h a t he was e n t i t l e d to s e v e r a n c e as a m a t t e r 
of r i g h t . S t a t e v. O 'Br i en , 721 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 1986) and 
c a s e s c i t e d t h e r e i n . R a t h e r , where t h e e v i d e n c e c l e a r l y 
e s t a b l i s h e d t ha t Co-Defendant Webb and h i s g i r l f r i e n d alone were 
found in p o s s e s s i o n of a sho t gun and some j e w e l r y a l l e g e d l y 
s t o l e n in the r o b b e r y , t h e j o i n t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n by L.D.A. in a 
j o i n t t r i a l p r e c l u d e d Mr. H u m p h r e y ' s t r i a l a t t o r n e y from 
a f f i r m a t i v e l y a r g u i n g t h a t Webb was indeed g u i l t y and t h a t Mr. 
Humphrey was being drawn in through sugges t ive photo d i s p l a y s . As 
s t a t e d in Holloway v . Arkansas , 435 U.S. a t 490-491, 
In a c a s e of j o i n t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of 
c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t the e v i l . . . _is JLn what 
r e f r a i n from doing, not only a t t r i a l but a l so 
as to p o s s i b l e p r e t r i a l p lea n e g o t i a t i o n s and 
in the sentencing p roces s . I t may be p o s s i b l e 
in some cases to i den t i fy from the record the 
p re jud ice r e s u l t i n g from an a t t o r n e y ' s f a i l u r e 
to u n d e r t a k e c e r t a i n s e n t e n c i n g t r i a l t a s k s , 
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but even wi th a r e co rd of the s e n t e n c i n g 
h e a r i n g a v a i l a b l e i t would be d i f f i c u l t to 
judge i n t e l l i g e n t l y the impact of a c o n f l i c t 
on the a t t o r n e y ' s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a c l i e n t . 
And to a s s e s s the impact of a c o n f l i c t of 
i n t e r e s t in t he a t t o r n e y ' s o p t i o n s , t a c t i c s 
and d e c i s i o n s in p l e a n e g o t i a t i o n s would be 
v i r t u a l l y imposs ib le . Thus, an inqui ry in to a 
c l a i m of h a r m l e s s e r r o r he re would r e q u i r e , 
u n l i k e mos t c a s e s , u n g u i d e d s p e c u l a t i o n . 
(Emphasis added.) 
The issue i s whether a p o t e n t i a l c o n f l i c t ex i s t ed such t ha t t r i a l 
c o u n s e l would have been a f f e c t e d in he r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of 
Defendant Humphrey. 
In d e t e r m i n i n g whether a c o n f l i c t e x i s t e d , one f i r s t 
must look to e t h i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . The American Bar Associa t ion 
Standards for Criminal J u s t i c e s t a t e : 
S t anda rd 4-3 .5(b) : Except for p r e l i m i n a r y 
m a t t e r s s u c h a s i n i t i a l h e a r i n g s or 
a p p l i c a t i o n s for b a i l , a lawyer or lawyers who 
a r e a s s o c i a t e d in p r a c t i c e s h o u l d n o t 
undertake to defend more than one defendant in 
the same c r i m i n a l case if the du ty to one of 
the d e f e n d a n t s may c o n f l i c t w i th t he d u t y to 
a n o t h e r . The p o t e n t i a l fo r c o n f l i c t of 
i n t e r e s t in r e p r e s e n t i n g m u l t i p l e d e f e n d a n t s 
i s so g rave t h a t o r d i n a r i l y a l awyer should 
d e c l i n e to a c t for more than one of s e v e r a l 
c o - d e f e n d a n t s e x c e p t in unusua l s i t u a t i o n s 
when, a f t e r c a r e f u l i n v e s t i g a t i o n , i t i s c l e a r 
t h a t : 
(i) no conflict is likely to develop 
( i i ) t h e s e v e r a l d e f e n d a n t s g i v e an 
i n f o r m e d c o n s e n t t o s u c h m u l t i p l e 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ; and 
( i i i ) t he c o n s e n t of the d e f e n d a n t s i s 
made a m a t t e r of j u d i c i a l r e c o r d . In 
d e t e r m i n i n g t h e p r e s e n c e of c o n s e n t by the 
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d e f e n d a n t s , t h e t r i a l j u d g e s h o u l d make 
a p p r o p r i a t e i n q u i r i e s r e s p e c t i n g a c t u a l or 
p o t e n t i a l c o n f l i c t s of i n t e r e s t of counsel and 
whether the d e f e n d a n t s f u l l y comprehend the 
d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a t an a t t o r n e y s o m e t i m e s 
encounters in defending m u l t i p l e c l i e n t s . 
American Bar Assoc ia t ion , Standards for Cr iminal J u s t i c e , 2d Ed. 
Vol. I , Defense Funct ion , §4-3 .5 "Conf l i c t of I n t e r e s t . " 
S i m i l a r l y , the Rules of P r o f e s s i o n a l Conduct of the Utah 
Supreme Court r e q u i r e , in p e r t i n e n t p a r t : 
Rule 1.7(b) A l awyer s h a l l not r e p r e s e n t a 
c l i e n t if t he r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h a t c l i e n t 
may be m a t e r i a l l y l i m i t e d by the l a w y e r ' s 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s to a n o t h e r c l i e n t or to a 
t h i r d person or by the l awyer ' s own i n t e r e s t , 
u n l e s s : 
(1) The lawyer r e a s o n a b l y b e l i e v e s the 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n w i l l not be adverse ly a f fec ted ; 
and 
(2 ) E a c h c l i e n t c o n s e n t s a f t e r 
c o n s u l t a t i o n . When r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of m u l t i p l e 
c l i e n t s in a s i ng l e mat te r i s under taken, the 
c o n s u l t a t i o n s h a l l inc lude exp lana t ion to each 
c l i e n t of the i m p l i c a t i o n s of the common 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and t h e a d v a n t a g e s and r i s k s 
involved . 
Both in the Comments to the Utah Rule and the Commentary t o the 
A.B.A. s t a n d a r d , the w r i t e r s r e c o g n i z e d t h a t the " p o t e n t i a l for 
c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t in r e p r e s e n t i n g m u l t i p l e d e f e n d a n t s in a 
c r i m i n a l case i s so grave" t h a t normally j o i n t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n by 
the same lawyer or law f i rm shou ld not o c c u r . A.B.A., S t a n d a r d s 
for C r i m i n a l J u s t i c e , 2d Ed. Vol . I , Defense F u n c t i o n , § 4 - 3 . 5 , 
Commentary a t 4-41; Utah Code of J u d i c i a l A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , Rules of 
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P r o f e s s i o n a l Conduct , Rule 1.7, Comments a t 185 ( C o n f l i c t s in 
L i t i g a t i o n ) . Moreover, the o b l i g a t i o n of the a t to rney to explore 
and expla in the s i t u a t i o n i s p a r t i c u l a r l y s t rong in c r i m i n a l cases 
because a c r i m i n a l d e f e n d a n t i s o f t e n e i t h e r w i l l i n g or coe rced 
in to accept ing any r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . A.B.A. S tandards , Id . 
Utah law has even c o d i f i e d t h e minimum s t a n d a r d s 
governing appointed counsel , r equ i r i ng among o thers the "undivided 
l o y a l t y " of a p p o i n t e d c o u n s e l in r e p r e s e n t i n g an i n d i g e n t 
defendant . Utah Code Ann. §77-32-1(4) (Supp. 1988). 
W h i l e U tah c o u r t s h a v e n e v e r h e l d t h a t j o i n t 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n by a l ega l defender o rgan i za t i on of co-defendants 
in a c r i m i n a l t r i a l i s per se p r o h i b i t e d , t h i s Court has concluded 
t h a t such r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s s u s p e c t and should be examined . 
S t a t e v. S m i t h , 621 P.2d 697 (Utah 1980) . In Smi th , one l e g a l 
de fende r r e p r e s e n t e d two d e f e n d a n t s a t the p r e l i m i n a r y h e a r i n g 
s t age . When one defendant subsequent ly plead g u i l t y , a d i f f e r e n t 
publ ic defender represented the remaining defender at t r i a l . No 
o b j e c t i o n was made a t t r i a l bu t on ly r a i s e d on a p p e a l . The Utah 
Supreme C o u r t d e t e r m i n e d t h a t a c o n f l i c t d id e x i s t in t h e 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n but found no a c t u a l p r e j u d i c e . Despite t h i s lack 
of p r e j u d i c e , r e v e r s a l was warranted because: 
. . . t h e a s s i s t a n c e of c o u n s e l i s among t h o s e 
" c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s so b a s i c to a f a i r 
t r i a l t h a t t h e i r i n f r a c t i o n can n e v e r be 
t r e a t e d as harmless e r r o r . " 
621 P.2d a t 699, quo t ing Chapman v. C a l i f o r n i a , 386 U.S. 18 , 2 3 , 
17 
87 S .Ct . 8 2 4 , 31 L.Ed.2d 483 ( 1 9 6 7 ) . 
Other c o u r t s have t aken a s i m i l a r approach t o S t a t e v. 
S m i t h , 621 P.2d 697. In Commonwealth v. Wes tb rook , 400 A.2d 160 
(Penn. 1979), the conv ic t i on was overturned where s epa ra t e pub l i c 
d e f e n d e r s r e p r e s e n t e d two b r o t h e r s wi th a d v e r s e i n t e r e s t s even 
though not co -de fendan t s . In S t a t e v. Robinson, 662 P.2d 1341 (N. 
Mex. 1983), the Court concluded f a c t u a l l y t h a t no a c t u a l c o n f l i c t 
e x i s t e d where a p u b l i c d e f e n d e r had b r i e f l y r e p r e s e n t e d a 
p o t e n t i a l co-defendant turned wi tness because independent counsel 
had been a p p o i n t e d to r e p r e s e n t the d e f e n d a n t . Re ly ing on 
S t a t e v. S m i t h , s u p r a , t h e New Mexico Cour t c a u t i o n e d p u b l i c 
a t t o r n e y s to avoid even the appearance of i m p r o p r i e t y . 
S t i l l o t h e r s have demanded t h a t any t i m e t h a t t h e r e i s 
m u l t i p l e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n by p u b l i c d e f e n d e r s or any law 
a s s o c i a t i o n , t he re must be an inquiry and a p p r a i s a l made as to any 
p o t e n t i a l c o n f l i c t s . S t a t e v. B e l l , 447 A.2d 525 (N.J. 1982) . 
This inqui ry has of ten been in a Rule 11 format , i . e . , a n a r r a t i v e 
d i s cus s ion with the defendant and counsel concerning any p o t e n t i a l 
Now Chief J u s t i c e Hal l d i s sen ted in S t a t e v. Smith based on the 
defendant ' s f a i l u r e to ob jec t a t t r i a l and the f a c t s of the ca se , 
621 P.2d at 700-701. Such a p o s i t i o n i s s t i l l c o n s i s t e n t with the 
r u l e s t a t e d on page 13 of t h i s b r i e f ; e i t h e r an a c t u a l c o n f l i c t 
must e x i s t or t he c o n f l i c t must be i n h e r e n t from the f a c t s such a t 
a " p o s s i b i l i t y of p r e jud i ce flows." Nei ther case r e q u i r e s proof 
of a c t u a l p r e j u d i c e . See a l s o S t a t e v. T i p p e t t s , 584 P.2d 892 
(Utah 1978) , where t h e t r i a l c o u r t d id i n q u i r e abou t a p o t e n t i a l 
c o n f l i c t but the defendant a f f i r m a t i v e l y waived any o b j e c t i o n . 
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c o n f l i c t s and if app rop r i a t e a knowing a vo lun ta ry waiver of those 
r i g h t s . Uni ted S t a t e s v. P e t z , 764 F.2d 1390, 1392 (11th C i r . 
1985) . These c o u r t s have r e c o g n i z e d t h a t in the a s s i g n m e n t of 
a t t o r n e y s for c o - d e f e n d a n t s a s s i g n m e n t to o u t s i d e independen t 
2 counsel should be the norm, and not the excep t ion . 
In the ca se a t b a r , a p o t e n t i a l c o n f l i c t e x i s t e d by the 
mere f a c t of t h e l e g a l d e f e n d e r s j o i n t l y r e p r e s e n t i n g c o -
defendants — not a per se c o n f l i c t , but a p o t e n t i a l . No inquiry 
was made. The c o n f l i c t was f u r t h e r b rough t to focus when Mr. 
Humphrey sought severance from Co-Defendant Webb in order to fu l ly 
p u r s u e h i s de f ense (R.81-82) . S t i l l no h e a r i n g was h e l d . Even 
when Mr. Humphrey expres s ly ra i sed the c o n f l i c t i s sue (R.287-288) , 
the t r i a l cour t refused to adequate ly address the i ssue (T.743) . 
C l e a r l y , t he f a c t s of t he ca se r a i s e d a c t u a l c o n f l i c t 
q u e s t i o n s . In b r i e f , independent counsel would have bo l s t e r ed the 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of t he e y e w i t n e s s e s t h a t Humphrey commi t t ed the 
c r ime . Independent counsel would have a t tacked the c r e d i b i l i t y of 
Co-Defendant Webb. Emphasis would have been placed on the fac t s 
t h a t subsequent to the robbery, Webb and h i s g i r l f r i e n d alone were 
1
 I n t e r e s t i n g l y , even a decade ago, seventy percen t (70%) of a l l 
p u b l i c de fende r o f f i c e s surveyed c a u t i o n e d a g a i n s t m u l t i p l e 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s and f o r t y - n i n e p e r c e n t (49%) r e f u s e d such 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . 447 A.2d a t 530 n . 8 , c i t i n g L o w e n t h a l , J o i n t 
R e p r e s e n t a t i o n in C r i m i n a l C a s e s : A C r i t i c a l A p p r a i s a l , 64 Va. 
L.Rev. 939, 950 n.40 (1978). 
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found w i th p r o p e r t y t aken in t he r o b b e r y . I ndependen t c o u n s e l 
would have b r o u g h t ou t t h a t B r i t t M a r t i n d a l e needed a " p a t s y " t o 
p r o t e c t her husband and used Humphrey because he knew Webb. 
I n d e p e n d e n t c o u n s e l would have emphas ized t h a t the gun found in 
Webb's home was the gun used by Webb in the r o b b e r y . T h e r e f o r e , 
the w i tnes ses had m i s i d e n t i f i e d Humphrey as the gunman. 
I n s t e a d , what was p r e s e n t e d to the j u r y was a u n i t e d 
f r o n t where both d e f e n d a n t s would succeed or f a i l t o g e t h e r . 
U n f o r t u n a t e l y , such was not in t he b e s t i n t e r e s t of Mr. Humphrey 
nor done with h i s agreement as evidenced by h i s p o s t - t r i a l Motion 
for a New T r i a l (R.287-288) . What o c c u r r e d was a " d i m i n u t i o n in 
[ the] zea l of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n " of Mr. Humphrey caused by the j o i n t 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of c o - d e f e n d a n t s by t h e same law a s s o c i a t i o n . 
A.B.A. S t a n d a r d s for C r i m i n a l J u s t i c e , 2d Ed. Vol. I , Defense 
F u n c t i o n § 4 - 3 . 5 , Commentary. Th i s l a c k of und iv ided l o y a l t y , 
though not i n t e n t i o n a l no the p a r t of t r i a l c o u n s e l , d e n i e d Mr. 
Humphrey the e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of c o u n s e l . 
T h e r e f o r e , t h i s Cour t must d e c i d e i f U tah ' s r i g h t t o 
c o u n s e l g r a n t s to an accused any r i g h t s beyond t h o s e m i n i m a l l y 
g u a r a n t e e d u n d e r f e d e r a l l a w . S p e c i f i c a l l y , i f t h e Utah 
C o n s t i t u t i o n guaran tees t ha t no money or fees need be advanced to 
secure the r i g h t of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , i t becomes incumbent on t h i s 
Court to r e q u i r e appointed counsel to ac t without c o n f l i c t s in the 
same manner as required of p r i v a t e counse l . If a s i n g l e a t t o r n e y 
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or a private law firm could not ethically or constitutionally 
represent both Mr. Humphrey and his Co-Defendant Webb then no 
lesser standard can be imposed where counsel is appointed. Utah 
Code Ann. §77-32-1(4) (Supp. 1988). 
P r o v i d i n g equa l j u s t i c e for poor and r i c h , 
weak and powerful a l i k e i s an age-old problem 
In t h i s t r a d i t i o n , o u r own 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l g u a r a n t e e s of due p r o c e s s and 
e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n both c a l l for p r o c e d u r e s in 
c r i m i n a l t r i a l s which a l l o w no i n s i d i o u s 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s between persons and d i f f e r e n t 
groups of persons . Both equal p r o t e c t i o n and 
due p r o c e s s emphas ize t he c e n t r a l aim of our 
e n t i r e j u d i c i a l sys tem - a l l peop le charged 
w i t h c r i m e m u s t , so f a r as t h e law i s 
c o n c e r n e d , " s t and on an e q u a l i t y be fo re the 
bar of j u s t i c e in every American cour t ." 
( C i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) . 
G r i f f i n v. I l l i n o i s , 351 U.S. 12 , a t 1 6 - 1 7 , 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 
L.Ed.2d 891 ( 1 9 5 6 ) . Whi l e i t i s t r u e t h a t c o n v e n i e n c e and 
economic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s may e n c o u r a g e a "wink and nod" from the 
t r i a l c o u r t s in al lowing l ega l defender a s s o c i a t i o n s to r o u t i n e l y 
r e p r e s e n t c o - d e f e n d a n t s , j u s t i c e d i c t a t e s a more c i r c u m s p e c t 
approach. 
I n q u i r y a t the t r i a l l e v e l should be mandated in a l l 
cases of m u l t i p l e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of co-defendants by the same law 
a s s o c i a t i o n . While heavy r e l i a n c e should be placed on counse l ' s 
e v a l u a t i o n of whether or not a c o n f l i c t e x i s t s , the t r i a l c o u r t 
must a l so inqu i re of the defendant as to h i s understanding of h i s 
r i g h t t o c o n f l i c t - f r e e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in the c o n t e x t of t he 
c i rcumstances of the c a s e . 
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If a p o t e n t i a l c o n f l i c t a p p e a r s , r e m e d i a l measu res 
should be requ i red . These could include severance , appointment of 
independent counsel and/or an on- the - record waiver of the c o n f l i c t 
by d e f e n d a n t in a Rule 11 f o r m a t . Most i m p o r t a n t l y , a t t o r n e y s 
must be encouraged to r e v i e w t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n for c o n f l i c t s 
e a r l y on in the case . Any doubts must be resolved in favor of the 
de fendan t . 
POINT II. THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL WAS 
INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION PURSUANT TO 
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-6-302.1 (1978) . 
The s tandard employed for reviewing the su f f i c i ency of 
e v i d e n c e and r e v e r s i n g a j u r y v e r d i c t i s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d . The 
Court must 
review the evidence and all inferences which 
may reasonably be drawn from it in light most 
favorable to the verdict of the jury. We 
reverse a jury conviction for insufficient 
evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of when he was 
convicted. (Citations omitted). 
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). However, 
[T]his Court still has the right to review the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the 
verdict. The fabric of evidence against the 
defendant must cover the gap between the 
presumption of innocence and the proof of 
guilt ... [T]he reviewing court will stretch 
the evidentiary fabric as far as it will go. 
But this does not mean that the court can take 
a speculative leap across a remaining gap in 
order to sustain a verdict. 
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_Id. at 444-45. 
Such speculative leaps have been identified by this 
Court in a number of cases. When accomplice and witness testimony 
is insufficient in that it "cast[s] a mere suspicion on the 
defendant," a conviction cannot be sustained on the mere 
possession of stolen property. State v. Laris, 2 P.2d 243, 248-49 
(Utah 1931). If the evidence tends to show a person other than 
the defendant stole the property now in the possession of the 
defendant, the evidence is insufficient. State v. Potello, 40 
Utah 56f 119 P. 1023, 1029 (1911). Mere possession of a gun used 
in burglary without more is insufficient. State v. Nichols, 145 
P.2d 802, 806 (Utah 1944). 
[T]he naked possess ion of s to l en p roper ty from 
6 t o 24 h o u r s a f t e r t h e l a r c e n y o r 
h o u s e b r e a k i n g , when unaccompanied wi th any 
o t h e r i n c r i m i n a t i n g f a c t or c i r c u m s t a n c e 
tending in some degree to connect the accused 
with the commission of the offense charged, i s 
n o t s u f f i c i e n t , of i t s e l f , upon wh ich t o 
c o n v i c t [ . ] 
S t a t e v. Har t , 10 Utah 204, 37 P. 330, 332 (1894). 
In S t a t e v. H i l l , 727 P.2d 221 (Utah 1986) , the Court 
held tha t the evidence was i n s u f f i c i e n t to support a conv ic t ion of 
b u r g l a r y because t h e r e was no d i r e c t e v i d e n c e t h a t d e f e n d a n t 
commi t t ed the b u r g l a r y or encouraged a n o t h e r to commit the 
bu rg l a ry . The only d i r e c t evidence was the possess ion of some of 
t he s t o l e n p r o p e r t y by t h e d e f e n d a n t . There was a r e a s o n a b l e 
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a l t e r n a t i v e h y p o t h e s i s s u p p o r t e d by the e v i d e n c e t h a t a n o t h e r 
pe r son had commi t t ed the b u r g l a r y , and " the e x i s t e n c e of a 
reasonable hypothes i s of innocence n e c e s s a r i l y ra i sed a r easonab le 
doubt as to t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s g u i l t . " Ld. a t 222. 
The e v i d e n c e adduced a t t r i a l was i n s u f f i c i e n t to 
s u p p o r t Mr. Humphrey's c o n v i c t i o n for a g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r y . The 
evidence aga in s t Mr. Humphrey cons i s t ed of the tes t imony of B r i t t 
M a r t i n d a l e , a gun, a wa tch , and a r i n g s e i z e d from Mr. Webb's 
apar tment and the ques t ionab le i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of Mr. Humphrey as 
the robber by Mr. Karmelian and Mr. Church a t the time of t r i a l . 
However, B r i t t Mar t inda l e ' s t es t imony i s not compel l ing . 
Her husband was a l s o s u s p e c t in t h e robbe ry but was g r a n t e d 
immuni ty from p r o s e c u t i o n (T.249) . Evidence r e l a t e d to the 
robbery was found in the car t h a t he a l l e g e d l y had s t o l e n (T.343-
45). No search was ever conducted of the Mart indale home (T.340-
41). This evidence c rea ted the reasonable hypothes is t h a t i t was 
the Mar t inda les who were involved in the robbery with Co-Defendant 
Webb, not Mr. Humphrey. 
The i d e n t i f i c a t i o n procedures were unduly sugges t ive and 
v i o l a t i v e of Mr. Humphrey's r i g h t to due p rocess . Therefore , the 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n t e s t i m o n y i s s u s p e c t and f a i l s to e s t a b l i s h t h a t 
Mr. Humphrey was the r o b b e r . In a d d i t i o n , the t e s t i m o n y of t h e 
two e y e w i t n e s s e s , i n c l u d i n g t h e i r i n a b i l i t y to p a r t i c u l a r l y 
d e s c r i b e t h e robber or t he gun he u sed , f a i l s to e s t a b l i s h t h a t 
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Mr. Humphrey was t h e pe r son who robbed t h e s t o r e . 
The mere p o s s e s s i o n by a c o - d e f e n d a n t of a weapon which 
may or may n o t h a v e been i n v o l v e d in t h e r o b b e r y and p o s s e s s i o n of 
a r i n g and a watch t h r e e weeks a f t e r t h e robbe ry was i n s u f f i c i e n t 
e v i d e n c e of g u i l t . Given t h e s u s p e c t a c c o m p l i c e and w i t n e s s 
t e s t i m o n y , t h e r e a s o n a b l e h y p o t h e s i s t h a t a n o t h e r pe r son commi t t ed 
t he c r i m e , and t h e l a ck of u n t a i n t e d i d e n t i f i c a t i o n e v i d e n c e , Mr. 
Humphrey's c o n v i c t i o n should be r e v e r s e d . 
POINT I I I . THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF SEVERAL OF 
THE PROSECUTOR'S REMARKS AT TRIAL AMOUNTED 
TO MISCONDUCT WARRANTING A MISTRIAL. 
The t e s t of w h e t h e r t h e r e m a r k s made by 
c o u n s e l a r e so o b j e c t i o n a b l e a s t o m e r i t a 
r e v e r s a l i n a c r i m i n a l c a s e i s , d i d t h e 
r e m a r k s c a l l t h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e j u r o r s t o 
m a t t e r s wh ich t h e y would n o t be j u s t i f i e d i n 
c o n s i d e r i n g in d e t e r m i n i n g t h e i r v e r d i c t , and 
w e r e t h e y , u n d e r t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h e 
p a r t i c u l a r c a s e , p r o b a b l y i n f l u e n c e d by t h e 
r e m a r k s . 
S t a t e v . V a l d e z , 30 Utah 2d 5 4 , 6 0 , 513 P.2d 4 2 2 , 426 ( 1 9 7 3 ) . 
S tep one i s g e n e r a l l y s a t i s f i e d when t h e r emarks c a l l " t h e j u r y ' s 
a t t e n t i o n t o m a t t e r s s u g g e s t i n g t h a t s o m e t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h e 
q u e s t i o n of t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s g u i l t or i n n o c e n c e i s b e f o r e t h e 
j u r o r s . " S t a t e v . A n d r e a s o n , 718 P.2d 4 0 0 , 402 (Utah 1 9 8 6 ) ; 
c i t i n g S t a t e v . Smi th , 700 P.2d 1106 , 1112 (Utah 1 9 8 5 ) . 
S t e p two i s more d i f f i c u l t and i n v o l v e s a 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t he c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h e c a s e 
a s a w h o l e . In mak ing s u c h a c o n s i d e r a t i o n , 
i t i s a p p r o p r i a t e t o l o o k a t t h e e v i d e n c e of 
d e f e n d a n t ' s g u i l t . . . [ I ] n a c a s e w i t h l e s s 
c o m p e l l i n g p roof , t h i s Cour t w i l l more c l o s e l y 
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s c r u t i n i z e t h e c o n d u c t . 
S t a t e v . T roy , 668 P .2d 4 8 3 , 486 (Utah 1 9 8 4 ) . 
S u c h r e m a r k s , e v e n t h o u g h h a r m l e s s when t a k e n 
s e p a r a t e l y , may n e c e s s i t a t e a new t r i a l based on t h e i r c u m u l a t i v e 
e f f e c t . Owens v . S t a t e , 654 P.2d 6 5 7 , 659 ( O k l a . C r i m . App. 
1 9 8 2 ) . Even one r e m a r k i n v i o l a t i o n of a c o u r t o r d e r l i m i t i n g a 
c e r t a i n l i n e of i n q u i r y can be g r o u n d s f o r r e v e r s a l , i f n o t " c u t 
s h o r t . . . b e f o r e any p r e j u d i c e o c c u r s [ s ] . " S t a t e v . S m i t h , 675 
P.2d 5 2 1 , 525 (Utah 1 9 8 3 ) . T h e r e f o r e , a d e l i b e r a t e and r e p e a t e d 
v i o l a t i o n of c o u r t o r d e r s and i n s t r u c t i o n s t o t h e p r o s e c u t i o n "may 
[ m o r e s t r o n g l y ] c o n s t i t u t e m i s c o n d u c t r e q u i r i n g a new t r i a l . " 
S t a t e v . M u s g r a v e , 102 N.M. 1 4 8 , 692 P.2d 5 3 4 , 536 (N.M. App. 
1984) . 
P r o s e c u t o r i a l m i s c o n d u c t r e q u i r i n g a new t r i a l has been 
found in s e v e r a l U tah c a s e s . In T r o y , t h e o u t s i d e m a t t e r s 
r e f e r r e d t o by t h e p r o s e c u t i o n i n c l u d e d r e f e r e n c e s t o t h e 
d e f e n d a n t ' s a l i a s and h i s i nvo lvemen t in o t h e r c r i m i n a l m a t t e r s . 
688 P.2d a t 4 8 6 . S i n c e p r o o f of g u i l t was n o t c o m p e l l i n g , t h e 
c a s e was r e v e r s e d and r e m a n d e d fo r new t r i a l . IQ. a t 4 8 7 . In 
Arici££a.s_on , t h e p r o s e c u t o r i n c l o s i n g a r g u e d a b o u t t h e 
p e r v a s i v e n e s s of t h e c r i m e c h a r g e d i n t h e c a s e and t h a t a 
c o n v i c t i o n would send a d e t e r r e n t message to a l l t h o s e c r i m i n a l s 
n o t b e f o r e t h e C o u r t , b u t a c t i n g in j u s t a s c u l p a b l e a m a n n e r . 
718 P.2d a t 4 0 2 . 
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Other c o u r t s have taken s i m i l a r a c t i o n s . That the 
defendant appeared in Court in handcuffs and t h a t the prosecutor 
made a s i n g l e ex tended remark in c l o s i n g a rgument conce rn ing a 
p r io r unre la ted a r r e s t was enough in Owens to r equ i r e a new t r i a l . 
654 P.2d at 658-59. 
In t h i s c a se , Co-Defendant Webb f i l ed a p r e - t r i a l motion 
j o i n e d by Mr. Humphrey t o l i m i t t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n by t h e 
p r o s e c u t i o n of p r i o r bad a c t s of the d e f e n d a n t s (R.105-06) . The 
T r i a l Court granted the motion, the reaff i rmed the ru l ing at the 
opening of the t r i a l (T .61-62) . D e s p i t e the C o u r t ' s o r d e r , the 
prosecutor r e fe r red in h i s c los ing argument to an a l leged po l ice 
s t o p of Mr. Webb and Mr. Humphrey in Oregon (T.617) . He c r o s s -
examined Mr. Humphrey about an a l leged po l i ce s top of Mr. Humphrey 
and Mr. Webb o u t s i d e a pawn shop ( T . 4 8 8 - 8 9 ) . He e l i c i t e d 
tes t imony from Detec t ive Lomax tha t r ings were found in a search 
t h a t connec ted Mr. Webb and Mr. Humphrey to uncharged c r i m e s 
(T.304-05). None of t h i s m a t e r i a l could proper ly be considered by 
t h e j u r y wi th r e s p e c t to Mr. Webb because of t he Motion In L imine . 
None of t h i s i s admiss ib le aga ins t Mr. Humphrey under Utah Rules 
of Evidence 404(b) . See S t a t e v. T a r a f a , 720 P.2d 1368, 1372 
(Utah 1986). 
The p r o s e c u t o r a l s o e l i c i t e d t e s t i m o n y t h a t Mr. Webb 
used an a l i a s (T.327) and in c l o s i n g argument s t a t e d t h a t Mr. 
Humphrey r e fused to p a r t i c i p a t e in a l i n e u p . Both of t h e s e 
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c o m m e n t s c o u l d h a v e b e e n e x c l u d e d u n d e r U t a h R u l e s of E v i d e n c e 403 
a s b e i n g more p r e j u d i c i a l t h a n p r o b a t i v e . See S t a t e v . D e A l o , 748 
P . 2 d 1 9 5 , 1 9 8 - 9 9 (Utah App . 1 9 8 7 ) . 
The e v i d e n c e a g a i n s t Mr. Humphrey i s n o t c o m p e l l i n g ; i t 
c o n s i s t s of t h e s u s p e c t t e s t i m o n y of B r i t t M a r t i n d a l e ( s e e P o i n t 
I I , s u p r a ) , and an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n p r o c e d u r e m a r k e d by v i o l a t i o n s 
o f d u e p r o c e s s ( s e e P o i n t V, i n f r a ) . Mr . H u m p h r e y s h o u l d b e 
g r a n t e d a new t r i a l b e c a u s e o f p r o s e c u t o r i a l m i s c o n d u c t i n t h e 
p r e s e n t o n e . 
POINT IV . THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR WHEN IT DENIED MR. HUMPHREY'S RECUSAL MOTION. 
"A j u d g e s h o u l d r e c u s e h i m s e l f when h i s ' i m p a r t i a l i t y 1 
m i g h t r e a s o n a b l y be q u e s t i o n e d . " S t a t e v . N e e l e y , 748 P .2d 1 0 9 1 , 
1094 (Utah 1 9 8 8 ) . T h i s "may r e q u i r e r e c u s a l w h e r e no a c t u a l b i a s 
i s s h o w n , " _Id . , i n o r d e r " t h a t t h e i n t e g r i t y o f t h e j u d i c i a l 
s y s t e m s h o u l d be p r o t e c t e d a g a i n s t a n y t a i n t o f s u s p i c i o n , " I d . 
A m o t i o n a n d a c c o m p a n y i n g a f f i d a v i t s 
r e q u e s t i n g d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n o f a t r i a l j u d g e 
f rom p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n a c a s e p r o p e r l y a s s i g n e d 
t o t h a t j u d g e m u s t s t a t e f a c t s f r o m w h i c h i t 
may be r e a s o n a b l y i n f e r r e d t h a t t h e j u d g e h a s 
a b i a s o r p r e j u d i c e w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e c a s e , 
a p a r t y o r c o u n s e l . 
R o d r i g u e z v . D i s t . C t . , C i t y & C o u n t y o f D e n v e r , 719 p.2D 6 9 9 , 703 
( C o l o . 1 9 8 6 ) . The a p p l i c a b l e U t a h s t a t u t e , U t a h Code Ann. § 7 7 - 3 5 -
2 9 ( c ) - ( d ) ( 1 9 8 2 , S u p p . 1 9 8 8 ) h a s a s i m i l a r r e q u i r e m e n t f o r t h e 
m o t i o n t o be b a s e d upon a f f i d a v i t s . 
Mr. Humphrey f i l e d a h a n d w r i t t e n a f f i d a v i t t o d i s q u a l i f y 
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t h e t r i a l j u d g e ( R . 1 4 1 - 4 4 ) . T h i s was a c c e p t e d by t h e C o u r t a s 
v a l i d c h a l l e n g e to h i s i m p a r t i a l i t y (T.62). The a f f i d a v i t a l l e g e s 
t h a t t h e t r i a l j u d g e was p r e j u d i c e d a g a i n s t Mr. Humphrey (R.144) 
and in s u p p o r t he c i t e d t h e s e f a c t s : The judge re fused to answer 
o r a c k n o w l e d g e t h e n u m e r o u s l e t t e r s Mr. Humphrey f i l e d w i t h t h e 
C o u r t (R.143) or t h e m o t i o n t o d i s q u a l i f y (R .143 ) , and t h e j u d g e 
r e f u s e d t o a l l o w Mr. Humphrey t h e c h a n c e t o a s s i s t in h i s own 
d e f e n s e (R .143-44 ) . 
Mr. Humphrey showed by h i s a f f i d a v i t t h a t t h e r e was a t 
l e a s t t h e a p p e a r a n c e of b i a s and l a c k of i m p a r t i a l i t y on t h e p a r t 
of t he j udge a g a i n s t Mr. Humphrey. His a f f i d a v i t i s s u f f i c i e n t in 
t h a t s p e c i f i c b i a s i s a l l e g e d w h i c h g i v e s r i s e t o a t l e a s t t h i s 
a p p e a r a n c e of b i a s . In o r d e r t o p r o t e c t t h e i n t e g r i t y of t h e 
s y s t e m , t h e t r i a l judge should have r e c u s e d h i m s e l f . His f a i l u r e 
t o do so r e s u l t e d in a c t u a l p r e j u d i c e t o Mr. Humphrey in t h a t t h e 
t r i a l was n o t c o n d u c t e d in an i m p a r t i a l m a n n e r . Mr. Humphrey 
should be g r a n t e d a new t r i a l . 
POINT V. MR. HUMPHREY'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS 
WAS VIOLATED WHEN THE STATE DESTROYED A 
PHOTO SPREAD THAT WAS EVIDENCE MATERIAL TO HIS 
GUILT OR INNOCENCE. 
Due p r o c e s s i s d e n i e d when e v i d e n c e i s d e l i b e r a t e l y 
d e s t r o y e d . S t a t e v . N e b e k e r , 657 P.2d 1 3 5 9 , 1363 (Utah 1 9 8 3 ) . 
"The m a t e r i a l i t y r e q u i r e d t o r e v e r s e a c r i m i n a l c o n v i c t i o n f o r 
s u p p r e s s i o n or d e s t r u c t i o n of e v i d e n c e as a d e n i a l of due p r o c e s s 
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i s more than e v i d e n t i a r y m a t e r i a l i t y . " Id . 
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l m a t e r i a l i t y r e q u i r e s t h a t t he re 
be a showing t h a t the suppressed or des t royed 
e v i d e n c e i s v i t a l to the i s s u e s of whe ther t he 
defendant i s g u i l t y of the charge and whether 
t h e r e i s a f u n d a m e n t a l u n f a i r n e s s t h a t 
r e q u i r e s t h e c o u r t t o s e t a s i d e t h e 
d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n v i c t i o n . A c o r o l l a r y of t h i s 
p r o p o s i t i o n i s , "the mere p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t an 
i tem of u n d i s c l o s e d i n f o r m a t i o n m i g h t have 
helped the defense or might have a f fec ted the 
outcome of the t r i a l , does not e s t a b l i s h 
' m a t e r i a l i t y ' in the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s e n s e . 
S t a t e v. J i m i n e z , 761 P.2d 577, 578-79 (Utah App. 1988) ; c i t i n g 
S t a t e v. Lova to , 702 P.2d 1 0 1 , 106 (Utah 1985) ; q u o t i n g Uni ted 
S t a t e s v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109-10 (1976) and adding emphasis . 
In Nebeker , t he S t a t e f a i l e d to p r e s e r v e pho to a r r a y s 
shown to the v i c t i m p r i o r to an i n - c o u r t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of t h e 
d e f e n d a n t by the v i c t i m . No due p r o c e s s v i o l a t i o n was found 
because " the d e f e n d a n t was not a f f i r m a t i v e l y i d e n t i f i e d in t h e 
u n p r e s e r v e d a r r a y nor d id the w i t n e s s e s f a i l t o i d e n t i f y the 
d e f e n d a n t from an a r r a y in which the d e f e n d a n t ' s pho tog raph had 
been s p e c i f i c a l l y p l a c e d . " Nebeker , 657 P.2d a t 1363. Thus, the 
c l a i m was based on a mere p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e might 
a f f ec t the t r i a l outcome. ld_. a t 1364. 
In J i m i n e z , the defendant claimed a v ideotape was erased 
by the S t a t e ; however , i t was u n c l e a r i f t h e v i d e o t a p e had even 
e x i s t e d . The Cour t was asked to s p e c u l a t e on the m a t e r i a l i t y of 
the evidence t h a t might have been des t royed . No v i o l a t i o n of due 
process was found in J iminez , 761 P.2d a t 579. 
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Here, however, all photo arrays were disassembled 
(T.311-12). On November 4, 1987, Mr. Karmelian chose one picture 
from the array as having a 50-50 chance of being the robber 
(T.723). This array contained a picture of Mr. Humphrey, but the 
officer was unsure if Mr. Karmelian had chosen the picture of Mr. 
Webb or Mr. Humphrey as the possible robber (T.723). 
In either case, the evidence is material and does not 
involve the mere possibility of affecting the outcome of the 
trial. If Mr. Karmelian originally identified Mr. Webb as the 
robber, this is exculpatory evidence in reference to Mr. Humphrey. 
If Mr. Humphrey was the one given the equivocal selection by Mr. 
Karmelian, the reliability of the identification of Mr. Humphrey 
by Mr. Karmelian is suspect. 
In d e t e r m i n i n g t h e r e l i a b i l i t y of t h e 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n u n d e r t h e t o t a l i t y of 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t he c o u r t must a l s o c o n s i d e r 
the o p p o r t u n i t y of the w i t n e s s to view t h e 
c r i m i n a l a t t h e t i m e of t h e c r i m e , t h e 
wi tnes s ' s degree of a t t e n t i o n , the accuracy of 
any p r i o r d e s c r i p t i o n of the c r i m i n a l , t he 
l e v e l of c e r t a i n t y d e m o n s t r a t e d d u r i n g t h e 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n procedure , and the t ime between 
the crime and the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . 
S t a t e v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353 , 357 (Utah 1980); c i t i n g Ne i l v. 
B i g g e r s , 409 U.S. 188 (1972) . 
Mr. Karmel ian was in the r o b b e r ' s p r e s e n c e for s e v e r a l 
m i n u t e s but s p e n t l i t t l e t ime look ing d i r e c t l y a t t he robber 
(T .114-15 , 1 2 5 - 3 0 ) . His a t t e n t i o n was focused on p e r f o r m i n g the 
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robber ' s demands (Ld.) . He was i naccu ra t e in h i s o r i g i n a l he igh t 
and we igh t d e s c r i p t i o n for the robbe r (T. 136-37) and was unab l e 
to s p e c i f i c a l l y d e s c r i b e the r o b b e r ' s c l o t h i n g in many r e s p e c t s 
(T. 1 3 2 - 3 3 ) . The f i r s t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n was two weeks a f t e r t h e 
c r ime . All of the Biggers f a c t o r s were shown by evidence a t t r i a l 
as shown a b o v e , e x c e p t fo r t h e u n c e r t a i n t y of t h e i n i t i a l 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . If the photo a r r a y had been kept i n t a c t , Mr. 
Humphrey would have been able to show t h i s u n c e r t a i n t y by e i t h e r 
po in t ing out t h a t i t was Mr. Webb who had been i d e n t i f i e d or t h a t 
Mr. Humphrey had been equ ivoca l ly i d e n t i f i e d . 
The e v i d e n c e d e s t r o y e d would have shown t h a t t h e 
o r i g i n a l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n was u n c e r t a i n . This along with the o ther 
p r o b l e m s in Mr. K a r m e l i a n ' s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of Mr. Humphrey was 
m a t e r i a l to a de t e rmina t ion of Mr. Humphrey's g u i l t or innocence. 
The d e s t r u c t i o n of the photo a r r ay was, t h e r e f o r e , a v i o l a t i o n of 
Mr. Humphrey's r i g h t to due process and a f a i r t r i a l . 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
his conviction and remand this case for dismissal or a new trial. 
l i s Respec t fu l ly submitted th y of June, 1989 
CONNIE L. MOWER 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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